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SOCIAL POLICY AND WAR
Paul Adans
The University of Texas at Austin
American writers on social policy usually treat war as a
diversion or interruption of progress towards a welfare state. The
progressive era was cut off by World War I, the New Deal was liq-
uidated as a hostile Congress and indifferent President turned tFeir
attention to World War I I , and the War on rove-ty gave way to the
war on Vietnam. "War," Max Lerner said in 1940, ''generally puts
an end to any period of social refo'rm."'1  British writers, however,
see it differently. Most have agreed with Bruce thit
The decisive event in the evolution of the Welfare
State was the Second World War ... The years of
active thought and planning were those fron 1941
to 1948: these mark an epoch in British history.
2
The difference should suggest both the distinct histories of the
two countries, and the need for an analytic framework in which
to examine more generally the relationship between war, the statc,
and social policy.
The importance of war in the formation of social policy
is perhaps most strongly stated by Richard Titmuss, in his essay,
"War and Social Policy":
The aims and content of social policy, both in peace
and In war, are thus determined - at least to a
substantial extent - by how far the co-operation of
the masies is essential to the successful prosecution
of war.
How does he come to this conclusion, .nd is it correct? After
raising some questions about Titmuss's argument (the most in-
formed and stimulating contribution to the question by a major
social policy analyst) I will propose a different approach, and
suggest how it might be applied to a comparison of social policy
in the United States and Britain in World War II. My primary
concern will be with the relation of war to social policy, the
state's organized efforts to affect the health and well-being
of the populace, rather than with war's impact on social or
political change in general. I will argue that social policy
is pressed out between the needs of capital on the one hand
and the struggles of labor (and/or specially oppressed groups
such as blacks or women) on the other; and that the impact of
war on social policy depends upon the demands it makes on the
19-
state, and upon the balance of class forces. What I offer is
a framework for analysis, not a history of social policy in
Britain and the United States in World War 1I.
4
Titmuss argues that war has become more total. It once
was a game played between rulers, risking a few subjects as
pawns while most social life was undisturbed. Now it involves
the whole society. Industry, agriculture, even family life
are affected. All are shaped and organized as part of a war
effort, the consequences of which are felt long before and
after any actual fighting. 5  In this progression from limited
to total war, Titmuss traces through four stages the state's
increasing concern with the quantity and quality of the
population:
(I) with the quantity of troops, leading to
census operations:
(ii) with the quality, or fitness for service,
of recruits;
(iil) with the physical health of the whole
population, especially of children, the
next generation of recruits;
(iv) with civilian morale.
These concerns, Induced by wars of increasing scale and in-
tensity, have, Titmuss argues, prompted many if not most
social policy developments in 8rItai. Thus the shocking
state of health of working class troops revealed in the Boer
War led to the establishment in 1906 of the school medical
service, meals for elementary school children, and other
services. In World War II the state's survival depended upon
the mobilization and support of almost the whole population.
The Education Act of 1944, the Beveridge Report, the National
Insurance, Family Allowances, and the National Health Service
Acts were all "in part an expression of the needs of war-time
strategy to fuse and unify the conditions of life of
civilians and non-civilians alike." The universalism of the
postwar "welfare state" reflected the extent to which the
"co-operation of the masses" was essential to military suc-
cess.
Titmuss bases his conclusions mainly on his and his
colleagues' studies of British social policy in World War II
and on Stanislav Andreski's theoretical work, Military Organi-
zation and Society.6  He sees World War II as a typical "modern
war", the culmination of a historical development from limi'ted to
total warfare. Andreski himself assumes no such progression.
His key variable is the "military participation ratio' (MPR),
defined as the proportion of militarily utilized individuals in
the total population.
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When the MPR is high, the ruling group must win the mas-,cs over
to support the war, convincing them that they are fighting for
themselves. Social inequalities will narrow, while the rulers
will also need ticht control over the population, Such a war
will foster both egalitarian and totalitarian tendencies. Wnen
th. MPR is low, the masses can be left alone, but a privilegqd
military elite will develop and social incqualities will widen.
He does not assume a historical progression fro.i low to high
MPR. He shows how MPR may rise or dccline with inventions such
as the stirrup, the long bow, or gunpowder, which require different
kinds of military organization. Andreski pcints out, however,
that, with the exception of post-revolutionary France, the major
European powers only adopted universal conscription after severe
military defeats. The fact that technico-military factors had
already rade mass armies more effective than professional ones
was not enough to lead to adoption of the former. The pressure
of military competition was also neccssary. (Thc Rus-ian Re-
volution showed, inter alia, that ruling classes had good cause
to resist mass conscript armies for as long es possible) 7
Andreski's indicators of MPR include extent of conscription
or national service, proportion of GNP going to the military
and to war production, and actual or anticipated civilian in-
juries. World War II certainly involved a high MPR, and it
strengthened statist and egalitarian tendencies, especially in
Britain where the MPR was substantially higher than in the U.S.
In both countries, military success required the participation
in the war effort of the working class and specially oppressed
social groups (women and, in the US, blacks). In both
countries these groups made substantial gains in terms of
employment, income distribution etc. which were not completely
reversed in the postwar period. ° The concept of the military
participation ratio, however, must be seen as only one element
in a larger explanatory framework. It does not explain why, if
the Boer War led to a school meals program in Britain, the US
Congress was able to cut heavily a school meals program in
World War II despite the evidence of malnutrition revealed by
the Selective Service examinations. Moreover, World War II
was not typical of later wars, such as Korea or Vietnam. More
typical of the present period are inter-imperialist wars fought
by proxy (which avoid direct confrontation between major powers)
or wars of national liberation (which do not threaten the
"mother country"). Korea was arguably a case of the first kind,
Vietnam of the second. Be that as it may, the Vietnam war
certainly involved a high MPR for the Vietnamese (and produced
egalitarian and totalitarian tendencies within that society),
but for the US It involved a low MPR, a small proportion of
GNP (or even of the total military budget) and low rates of
conscription and civilian injury. It was also a regressive
war in terms of its effects on social inequalities and the real
living standards of workers. 9
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There has been a tendency on the part of both Fabian-type
social democrats in Britain and some New Deal liberals In the
United States to welcome those aspects of war which strengthen
the state. For them, a strong "positive" state is essential
to the pursuit of social justice and the modification of blind
and ruthless market forces. Such considerations led Fabians
into wholehearted support of British imperialism before and
during World War I and encouraged New Dealers in the sub-
ordination of their domestic goals (includin 9  civil liberties)
to the US's military effort in World War 11. 0 These "social-
imperialist" impulses are more than ever misguided in a nuclear
age. Not only are contemporary limited wars likely to be socially
regressive, but a "total war" in the future would presumably
be a nuclear war, and therefore one which would not involve
mass mobilization and conscript armies. Indeed, given the
present centrality of nuclear weapons in the "defense" of the
great powers, it is probable that World War II was atypical
in involving a high MPR in those countries.
Titmuss's generalizations about war and social policy are
thus based too narrowly on Britain and World War II. They
also fail to see war itself as a member of a larger class,
namely social crisis. American historians of social policy
point to the Great Depression much as the British do to World
War II. It too broke down resistance to social and economic
planning, strengthened the role of the state, flattened the
social pyramid somewhat, and produced the basic legislation
of the "welfare state." No one would claim that the social
policy of the New Deal is usefully explained as the state's
response to an impending major war. It is necessary to
distinguish the specific impact of war, and of different kinds
of war, from the impact that any kind of crisis might have on
a given social structure. Titmuss's claims for war as the
major determinant of social policy are too large. A major
crisis, whether war or depression, is likely to lead to a new
level of state intervention, which then has independent effects
in the economy and society which prevent a return to the
status quo ante. 11
An Important element in the explanation of social policy
neglected by Titmuss (except in terms of wartime morale), is
the response of the state and ruling groups to pressures from
below. The reforms of the last Liberal government in Britain
are not adequately explained as belated reactions to the Boer
War, or as preparations for World War I. They also reflect
the attempt to hold and incorporate the rising labor movement
within the two capitalist-party system. The Liberals failed
in this attempt in Britain, whereas Roosevelt succeeded in
holding labor in the Democratic Party and Johnson had similar
success with regard to the black movement in the 1960s.
1 2
The "cooperation of the masses" may become problematic in
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circumstances other than war. Capitalism is a highly dynamic,
competitive system (war being only the most intense and deadly
form of this competition). It generates social costs, dis-
locations and oppositional movements which force the capitalist
class (or sections of it), however reluctantly, to look to the
state and its social policy (and/or forces of repression) for
so lutions.
None of these qualifications of Titmuss's arguments should
obscure its implicit point, that ruling groups in a class
society will take steps which benefit the health and welfare of
the population (i.e. of subordinate classes and strata) when
they face a situation in which the needs or demands of that
population can no longer be ignored. The needs themselves,
however pressing, do not guarantee social provision.
Henry Sigerist, the medical historian, pointed out that in
ancient Rome war led to the establishment of extensive and
sometimes elaborate institutions for the medical care of
soldiers when "it was in the interest of the army to restore
the wounded as quickly and as thoroughly as possible."13
On the other hand, he observes, the lack of war led to the
establishment of vedical facilities for slaves, since in
peacetime there were no prisoners of war to replenish the
supply of slaves and "it became profitable tO spend money
for the restoration of the slaves' health."1  In either case,
the needs of the ruling class, not those of the potential
patients, were the determining factor. Unfortunately Titmuss
himself obscures this point as a result of his social-
democratic conception of the state. The state, in this view,
represents the collective interest of society, not merely of the
ruling class or group in society. While it may be unduly In-
fluenced, or even controlled by dominant groups, the state is
essentially above class conflicts. The state intervenes to
redress inequalities, to impose "social discipline" and assure
a measure of economic security for all. 1 5  The "social dis-
cipline" imposed by war and enforced by the state is seen as
being a restraint on individual greed in the interests of the
collectivity, rather than, for example, as the price which
capital has to pay for the preservation of a system based
upon inequality and exploitation. Titmuss certainly conceives
of class differences, but he sees classes as groups based
upon and defined by gradations of wealth, income, occupation,
and so on. By contrast the view implicit In this paper sees
the two main classes of capitalist society, the capitalist
and working classes, as defined by their antagonistic relation-
ship to each ofter and their specific relationship to the means
of production. For Titmuss, classes are not necessarily in
conflict with each other: together they constitute "societys,
which can function effectively and humanely in its "search for
equity" (a recurrent phrase) given sensible and informed
legislation.
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The state, in this conception, ideally represents the mutual
collective interests of all classes, of society as a whole. Thus,
when talking of the state's response to war he easily slips into
the first person plural: he talks of "our concern for communal
fitness" and how it has followed closely upon "our military
fortunes." Talking of civilian morale In World War ii he em-
phasizes that "millions of ordinary people" had to be convinced
that "we had something better to offer than had our enemies.,,17
How are "we" going to convince "them"? Titmuss cites the
famous post-Dunkirk editorial in The Times, a call for social
justice which reveals the consciousness, unevenly shared in the
British ruling class circles to whom the newspaper is addressed,
that if "we" are to convince "them" to continue the fighting
and the sacrifice, "we" are going to have to make substantial
concessions. The significance of Dunkirk for the timing of this
editorial is not that this near-disaster led to a great upsurge
of cross-class national solidarity but that, on the contrary,
morale among both civilians and troops was then in a quite pre-
carious state. 1 8 As Arthur Marwick observes with regard to the
blitz:
The expressions of exultation and of social
solidarity are to be found almost exclusively
in the diaries and comments of middle- and
upper-class people... The expressions of
hostility to an established system which had
failed to provide adequate protection and
post-raid services, are to be found among
the working class, and also among the more
socially conscious of their betters. 19
World War I had ended, in many countries, in strikes, demonstrations,
and revolution. This fact was not lost on Britain's rulers in
World War II. As Quintin Hogg put it in the parliamentary debate
on the Beveridge Report (17 February, 1943): "If you do not give
the people reform, they are going to give you social revolution.
Let anyone consider the possibility of a series of dangerous
industrial strikes, following the present hostilities, and the
effect it would have on our industrial recovery..." 2 0  Wars
often begin by masking the contradictions of a class society with
widespread patriotic fervor and solidarity; but if they are at
all long or difficult they are bound to expose and sharpen those
contradictions.
In the course of this discussion of Titmuss's essay, several
points have emerged: the demands or needs of the subordinate
classes, and the extent to which rulers are forced by war (or
other circumstances) to respond to them, the need of rulers for
a healthy military and workforce to support them, the relation-
ship of the state to different classes. The problem now is to
relate these elements in an analytic framework which will make it
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possible to understan6 more clearly the differential impact of
World War II on social policy in the United States and Britain,
as well as being of more qcneral application. Since, like Titmuss,
I am using "social polic" to refer to certain activities of the
state, such a fraj:ework must also define a conception of the
state.
How then, is the relationship of social policy to different
social classes and to the state, to be conceptualized? Social
policy in a modern, capitalist society reflects the needs of
capital for a workforce with an adequate level of health,
education, and economic and social security. 2 1  Labor costs
and the indirect expenses of production have been increasingly
socialized, that is paid as taxes and delivered in the form of
state-provided benefits or services, rather than being ret
entirely through the paycheck or provided by individual employers.
At the same time, workers have organized to demand not only
higher wages, but also higher social benefits. Their demands
do not necessarily stop at what would be from a capitalist
perspective the optimum point, the minimum level at which no
loss of efficiency occurs. Social policy, as well as repression,
may also aim at social order, conditions which allow the ac-
cumulation of capital to proceed in a relatively haroonious
and predictable environment. Thus, it may be directed not only
at workers and their families, and those temporarily out of work,
but at those on the margins of the workforce or outside it al-
together.
Just as workers' pressure for higher wages compels capital
to rationalize production and raise productivity, so workers'
pressure (exerted through their class organizations - unions and
parties - and through strikes, demonstrations and other actions)
for decent health, education, housing, and economic security
compels capital to rationalize the provision of these, through
the state if necessary. Indeed the processes are not merely
analogous but interrelated. Wage pressure induces technological
innovation to maintain competitiveness, and these new conditions
in turn require a more reliable, healthy, educated workforce,
and measures to deal with the social dislocations carried in
the wake of rapid technological change. From this perspective,
an analytic framework may be developed which sees social policy
as being pressed out between the needs of capitalism (in parti-
cular the need for a regulated supply of efficient labor-power,
and for social stability and order), and the struggles of the
working class for adequate income, health, education, housing,
social security, etc. What results may be see as an "unstable
equilibrium of compromises". 2 2 The nature and content of those
compromises depend - as does the question of whether they in-
volve real sacrifices or concessions on the part of capital,
or merely capitalist rationalization - on the balance of class
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forces at a particular conjuncture. Such an equilibrium in 'no
way implies equivalence of power, still less equal participation
in the actual policy-making process.
The locus of thisequilibrium is the state, and it is in the
state's social policy that the compromises are crystallized. The
capitalist state is the institution whose primary function is to
maintain order and harmony in the relations of production.
Carrying out this function is by no means a simple or obvious
task. It is not always clear what policy will further this
system-maintenance function, nor, if it were, would it neces-
sarily be possible to carry it through against resistances, even
within the state itself. The state is far from monolithic, even
under fascism, reflecting divisions and conflicts of interest
and ideology within the capitalist class as well as the dif-
ferentially "felt" pressures of subordinate classes and strata.
The state may thus appear as a battleground of "warring princi-
palities", as Moynihan describes the departments of the federal
government debating the War on Poverty.2 3  (Howard Dratch paints
a comparable picture of the disputes within the expcutive branch
over federally funded child care in World War II.) But the state
is also distinct from the capitalist class or any section of it,
and is unable to function adequately to the extent that it is
directly subjected to control by particular capitalist interests.
It is a capitalist state in the sense that it is structurally
bound (its strength and survival depend upon capital, if only
for the source of its revenues) to the function of aiding,
organizing, co-ordinating, the accumulation of capital and
ensuring the social conditions in which that accumulation can
take place, even at the expense of short-term or sectional
capitalist interests. The state's social policy, then, may
involve the enforcing of concession or sacrifice (or rational-
ization) upon part or all of the capitalist class, in spite of
its hostility, in the general interests of maintaining the system.
Moynihan is also correct in this sense when he talks (within a
different theoretical framework, of course) of the state's ability
to "assume an innovative and responsible role in the resolution
of social conflict and inequity". 2 5
The more threatened the capitalist class, in general, the
less able it is to solve its problems by "voluntary" means, and
the stronger the role the state has to play. Major wars and
depressions are crises in which the state is forced to assert
its authority against the prerogatives of individual capitals,
and the capitalist class is forced to submit, or both may perish.
Such crises impose new needs on capital and the state, and at
the same time render them more susceptible to pressure from
below. This does not imply that state organs are independent
of and above specific interests and pressures in times of crisis.
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On the contrary, there is likely to be an accelerated corporatist
trend, a partial integration of employers and trade union
bureaucrats into parts of the state machinery. This constitutes
a partial negation of the separation of the political and the
economic which, in principle, characterizes capitalism (a negation
which nevertheless takes places on the basis of that separation,
just as "monopoly" develops on the basis of competition and only
partially negates it),
With the aid of this framework (which draws upon an ex-
tensive recent Marxist literature on the theory of the state)26 ,
it is possible to see World War II as a crisis which, like the
Depression, threatened (or made vulnerable) the national capitalist
classes and necessitated the emergence of a "strong state" cap-
able of encroaching on the prerogatives individual capitalists
and overcoming their suspicion and hostility towards it. The
"threat", or vulnerability, in the case of World War II, ray be
seen as in part internal, taking the form of a heavy dependence
on the active support of, and participation in the war effort
by subordinate cltsscs and strata. This vulnerability to pres-
sure from below (pressure which although partially offset by
suppression of d~ssent and tight control over the population, is
not fully relieved even by very high levels of repression) is
present in any war where there is a high MPR. 2 7 In the case of
World War II, however, "military participation" must be under-
stood in a broader sense, for it represents the culmination of
a two-century trend towards the integration of the productive
forces and the armed forces. 2 8 The technico-military demands
of the war imposed on the state the need to subordinate the
entire economic life of the country to the war effort, the
need to determine what would be produced, by whom, and often
for whom. Planning and controls over many aspects of economic
and social life were raised to new levels.
What were the results for social policy? Perhaps the
earliest and most urgent area of need to be identified by the
state In both Britain and the US was that of health. As war
has become more technological, so armies have raised the standards
of health for their soldiers. Health standards have been signi-
ficantly higher for the military than for industrial production,
as draft rejection rates have dramatically revealed. In war-
time, however, the health of workers (especially those with skills
needed for essential production) becomes much more important
than at other times (including, of course, a depression) due
to the shortage of labor - and the situation is exacerbated by
measures taken to meet the health needs of the military.
Of the first 2 million men examined for military service
in the United States, half were rejected as unfit for service,
a result which caused considerable alarm, especially in view
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of the low minimum requirements, the Army's expectation of only
a 20 percent rejection rate, and the fact that those examined
presumably constituted the healthiest part of the population. 2 9
The Selective Service examinations revealed, among other things,
serious problems of malnutrition, as the National Nutrition
Conference for Defense noted as early as May, 1941. Attention
was also focused, both in social policy and business journals,
on the tremendous loss to industrial production (running at about
400 million "man days" annually) due to illness. 3 0
The war, then, exposed these and other health problems or,
more accurately, made them a problem for the state. It also
aggravated the situation. The shortages and maldistribution of
health care professionals and services were exacerbated as
physicians and nurses entered the armed forces. By 1943, there
was only one physician for every 100 servicemen, but one for
every 3,500 civilians. The poorer rural areas of the country
with greatest shortages often overfilled their quotas for the
military while more urban and prosperous areas failed to meet
theirs, so increasing the maidistribution. The physicians who
continued to tend civilians were likely to be older or sicker
than those In the army. The situation was especially bad in the
war-boom towns, where thousands lived and worked in dangerous,
crowded, and unsanitary conditions. 3 1
In spite of these problems, the war produced a substantial
improvement in health status and health care in almost all fields,
whether measured by public and private expenditures, hospital
beds, number of physicians and other health personnel, life ex-
pectancy, infant mortality, or Incidence of most diseases. 3 2
Much of this improvement was, of course, an unintended side
effect of the war, derived from the general improvement in the
living standards of the population as labor scarcity (gradually
and unevenly) replaced mass unemployment. People could afford
to eat better and to spend more on health care - and they did
both. In part, however, it reflects the conscious recognition,
within the state and among business leaders, that the national
health had become too important a matter to be left to the suc-
cession of reports and conferences which, with the exception of
a few relatively minor New Deal programs (food stamps and grants
-in-aid for maternal and child health programs), had characterized
the previous decade.
The concern of employers with the health of their workforce
was expressed in many ways, from the handing out of vitamin pills,
to provision of physical examinations, hot meals, improved health
and safety conditions (especially where women were employed), and
most significantly for the long term, involvement in various forms
of health insurance. Perhaps the most conscious industrialist
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in this field was Henry J. Kaiser, who not only saw the importance
to production of a healthy workforce and supported prepaid medical
care for all, but instituted his own prepaid group medical care
scheme (with the assurance of federally guaranteed profits from
war contracts) in the face of intense AMA opposition. 3 3
The state's response to the health problem also took many
forms. Some sixteen million servicemen and their dependents
were provided with a program of socialized medicine, albeit
a short-term one. Many pre-existing conditions were treated
(especially defects of teeth and eyesight) and about 2 million
men were salvaged for military service as a result of induction
examinations. Many servicemen received good medical treatment
and a balanced, adequate diet for the first time in their lives.
In the war boom towns the federal government financed the con-
struction of hospitals and clinics, and in naiy cases the US
Public Health 'ervice provided more and better services than
had existed before the war.3 A lono-teri effect of the war was
a substantially increased government role in health care fi-
nancing, especially in the fields of hospital construction,
research, education, and mental health.
In Britain a similar pattern emerged: 1) serious problems
of health, and of halth care organization and financing, 2)
exigencies of war which rendered these problems visible and
immediate while at the same time aggravating them, and 3) a
response by the state and employers (in this case, primarily
the state) which, in conjunction with other factors, led to
improved health, a rationalization of the health care system,
and a substantial increase in the state's role. 3 5  There are,
of course, important differences. These have to be explained
within the framework of the differential impact and nature of
the war and the different society (i.e. the distinct conjuncture
of economic, political, ideological, and social conditions)
upon which the war impacted.
As Titmuss documents in his Problems of Social Policy, the
Emergency Medical Service had very early to recognize that war-
time planning must include provision for civilians. A much
higher casualty rate for civilians was expected than actually
occurred, but civilians still suffered a higher number of
casualties than the armed forces until the third year of the
war. The special treatment and privileges which soldiers and
veterans receive In wars with a low MPR had to be extended to
the whole population, culminating in this case in the provision
of a universalist National Health Service. Again, as Titmuss
shows, the dependence of the war effort on the support and
sacrifice of the working class undermined or made intolerable
many of the class distinctions and privileges of pre-war Britain,
and made possible a degree of universalism in social policy in
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the 1940's from which successive governments of both parties have
steadily pulled back. 36
In the United States the state was less seriously threatened
from outside than Britain (the only major European country not
to be defeated in the course of the war). It was therefore less
dependent upon the enthusiastic support and sacrifice of the whole
population. Concessions and benefits, consequently, were directed
more selectively at the pressure points, particularly toward the
military and skilled and/or organized labor. The military/civilian
distinction remained intact (despite heavier casualties in war
industries than in the armed forces), and the substantial gains
made by soldiers and veterans, in health, education, and welfare
provision were not extended to the population as a whole. Veterans'
benefits were, as Wilensky puts it, a back do35 that did not in
this case open to the rest of the population. As a result of these
social policies, World War II veterans became a rgatively pre-
vileged part of the population.3 8This selectivity of provision
was, of course, facilitated by a politically weak labor movement
which, despite the trade union gains of the 1930's, had failed to
organize an independent labor party. In Britain, on the other
hand, the social-democratic ideology of theLabor Party lent itself
admirably to the carrying out of a substantial program of capitalist
rationalization by the state which included some real benefits
for the working class, under the guise of an advance towards
socialism, or at least towards social justice.4 0
The relative weakness of the threats from outside and below
in the US made it possible for the professional monopoly of the
American Medical Associatron to withstand the pressure of organi-
zed labor for adequate health care, or rather to divert it into
private and localized channels. The conjuncture of AMA opposition,
the needs of capital, the pressures of labor, and the interventions
of a state at war are interestingly reflected by Somers and Somers
in this conclusion to their chapter on the growth of the "Ubiquitous
third party":
It was entirely fortuitious that the American
Medical profession's successful campaign against
public health insurance during the lat thirties
and forties coincided with the vast expansion
of organized labor and collective bargaining.
But the implcations of this fact were great.
From the end of World War II, the growth of
private health insurance and of industrial
"health and welfare" plans were inextricably
interrelated. Enlightened management's in-
creasing concern for "human relations" in
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industry, the wartime wage stabilization
program .,ith its encouragement of "fringe
benefits", and the effect of National
Labor Relations Board and the United States
Supreme Court decisions in making such
benefits a routine matter for collective
bargaining all helped to accelerate the
"shotgun" marriage of medical care and
industrial relations.
4 1
Health was only one, if a major, social policy concern of
American and British covernments in World War II. The demands
of the draft, war production, and labor scarcity produced tre-
mendous physical nobility in both countries. Existing family
arrangements were put under severe strain by the dispersal of
family heads and, especially, by the absorption of women into
the armed forces, auxiliary services, and civilian employment.
The need for women in production conflicted with doriestic
functions normally performed by women and sometimes depending
upon neighborhood networks - functions of the "social economy"
which are urinaid, arid, in term, of their importance for the
economy as a whole, usually unrecognized. Consequently, as
Ferguson and Fitzgerald put it in their volume in the U.K. Civil
Series of the offical History of the Second Wo-ld War, families
became less self-reliant in war-time and "'Twhat family and
neighborhood could now no longer do for themselves, the State
had to help them do". 4 2 The state "had to" make some provision
because of the nature and demands of the war.
In this area of social policy we find a pattern similar to
that discussed with regard to health. The war exposed the
weakness of existing arrangements, aggravated them, and elicited
a response from the state which amounted to an unprecedented
level of state intervention in economic and social life. In
comparing Britain and the United States, again we find a similar
pattern: a more severe "war threat" (producing a higher MPR
despite the same military technology) and more thoroughgoing
state Intervention with more lasting results in Britain. In
the United States, the controversy over federally funded group
child care, explored in detail by Dratch, shows a decentralized
and divided state, one that could afford to be so because of the
strength of the capitalist class and the weakness of internal
and external threats to it. The U.S. Children's Bureau, with
Its traditional child welfare ideology, led the opposition
to the Federal Works Administration, which was more concerned
about employment and production than about keeping children with
their own mothers or in individual foster arrangements during
the working day. Federal funding was provided for group child
care, but as an emergency measure, under the 1940 Lanham Act
so thatitsdlscontinuance at the end of the war was assured.
4 3, 4 4
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In view of the considerable disparity in the effect of
World War II on national social policy, it is not surprising
that British and American writers have viewed the relationship
of war and social policy so differently. While these dif-
ferences in part reflect the serious neglect of the importance
of World War II for American social policy developments, they
also reflect real variations of historical experience. I have
attempted to develop a framework within which both national
experiences can be understood. The framework takes account both
of the nature of the war and the demands it makes upon the state
(in particular, the MPR), and also the nature of the society
(that is, the balance of class forces at a particular historical
conjuncture) upon which the war impacts.
The Boer War, as Titmuss says, led to the provision of
school meals in Britain, because the health of the next gen-
eration of recruits was a matter of concern to the State. In
the United States, however, the evidence of widespread mal-
nutrition revealed by the Selective Service examinations did
not prevent Congress from cutting the subsidies for the school
lunch program almost to nothing. The connection between the
Boer War and school meals program in Britain depends upon the
interaction of the needs of the state for a healty military
(although the MPR alone is obviously insufficient as an ex-
planation), the need of capital for a healty workforce, and
the pressure exerted by a working class with a measure (at the
time growing) of ideological and organizational independence.
The reaction of the US Congress to school lunches has to be
explained within the context not only of a state engaged in a
major war involving a high MPR, but also of a capitalist class
which resists the incursions of the state unless its need for
them is inescapable, and of a labor movement which, despite
tremendous gains in adverse conditions, had failed to establish
an independent political party, even a bureaucratic one like
the British Labor Party, which accepted the exigencies of
capitalism as setting the limits of reform.4 5
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